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Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to
Relieve the Current Burdens
by ERIC D. YoRDY*

Introduction
Just north of the historic Route 66 town of Flagstaff, Arizona, sit the
San Francisco Peaks, beautiful spectacles of nature and glowing examples
of limited government intervention and constitutional interpretation gone
awry. For years, native tribes who hold the Peaks sacred have been
clashing with the United States Forest Service over approval to develop a
ski resort on the Peaks.' This recurring dispute between religious sanctity
and economic development has been analyzed both under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and under the newer Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), a federal statute signed into law in
1993 in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.2 That 1990 decision,
criticized for ignoring the principle of a limited federal government and the
First Amendment freedoms of American citizens, engendered a falling-out
in Congress and the lower courts that moved religious freedom from its
fairly well-defined position under the First Amendment to a position of
confusion-where it is somewhat protected under the Constitution, but is
now also protected under federal and state statutes with unknown and
undefined boundaries.

* Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Practice in Business Law, The W. A. Franke
College of Business, Northern Arizona University. Professor Yordy has a J.D. from Cornell Law
School and an M.Ed. in Counseling and Student Affairs from Northern Arizona University. The
author expresses thanks to members of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and the Pacific
Southwest Academy of Legal Studies in Business for their feedback at national and regional
conferences. Special thanks to Professor T. Leigh Anenson of the University of Maryland for her
insight and assistance.
1. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056
(1984).
2. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
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Using the dispute between the native tribes of northern Arizona and
the federal government over the development of the Peaks, this article will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, as well as the
subsequent activities of courts and legislative bodies, has disrupted wellsettled law and has created a quagmire of confusion related to religious
freedom. The Supreme Court will likely have an opportunity to fix this
legal disaster as the current Peaks lawsuit progresses through the court
system to an inevitable writ of certiorari. As it faces this particular suit, the
Court can and should overrule Smith, declare RFRA unconstitutional, and
restore the proper test for the analysis of the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause.
I.

Early Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ,3 From the beginning, free
exercise of religion was not an unlimited license to behave in any way one
saw fit.4 In its first constitutional free exercise case addressing the
amendment, the Supreme Court upheld anti-polygamy laws and noted that
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order." 5 In 1940, when it overturned the conviction of
several Jehovah's Witnesses for religious solicitation, the Court affirmed
that beliefs were to be free of regulation and that some actions, but not all,
were not to be regulated.6 While these early cases began to interpret the
boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause, they did not give any guidance to
the extent of government regulation allowed, nor did they enunciate a clear
test to determine the constitutionality of regulating religious behavior.7
Thus, government regulations of behavior were to be reviewed on a case-

3.
4.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
For a comprehensive review of religion clause cases and jurisprudence, see Stephen
Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 7 (1993).
5. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). In 1847, the Court heard a case
involving the Catholic Church, but did not mention the Free Exercise Clause at all. Permoli v.
Municipality No. I of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845); see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990)
(containing a detailed history of the origins of the Free Exercise Clause).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
7. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: TowardA Unified Theory
of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of GeneralApplicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9,
13(2001).
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by-case basis-a method that was neither a model of judicial efficiency nor
helpful to decision makers.8
Because cases related to burdens on religion were somewhat rare, the
needed guidance did not come from the Court until 1963 with the
enunciation of the compelling interest test in the famous case of Sherbert v.
Verner.9

II. The Rise of the Compelling Interest Test
In Sherbert v. Verner,l0 the Supreme Court held that South Carolina
illegally withheld unemployment compensation from a Seventh Day
Adventist who was fired (and could not find other work) because she
would not work on her religious day of rest: Saturday.' In its analysis, the12
Court used what has become known as the "compelling interest test.",
That test mandates that in order for a state action to permissibly burden
religion, the action must be the least burdensome way for the state to
achieve a compelling state interest. 13
Nearly ten years later, the Court solidified the compelling interest test
as the appropriate test in Free Exercise cases.' 4 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
Amish children challenged a state compulsory education statute because of
their sincerely held religious belief that education in high school or beyond
could endanger their salvation. 15 The Court noted that even though the
government may have the jurisdiction to control education, a "regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion."' 16 Using the compelling interest test, the
Court determined that there was no sufficient justification for compulsory
8. One scholar has argued that the Court had actually set forth something of a test in the
form of a coherent jurisdictional analysis and that the amendment put certain things outside the
jurisdiction of the government, but not others. Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past,
Present and Future, 6 REGENT U. L. REv. 7 (1995). While this argument is interesting, the
jurisdictional test is based primarily in the idea that certain historically religious practices are
exempt from regulation (sacramental use of bread and wine, assembling for worship and
proselytizing, for example), but does not take into account non-mainstream religious practices
that may be sincere and worthy of protection from regulation.
9. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963).
10.

Id.

11. Id.
12. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (West 2008); Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 n.4; Id. at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at403.
14.
15.
16.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 220 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398).
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education as applied to the Amish. 17 In its analysis, the Court rejected the
state's interests in preparing students for participation in the political
system, as well as protecting children from ignorance and from
unscrupulous employers who may violate8 the child labor laws if children
are readily available instead of in school.'
After Sherbert and Yoder, the test for analyzing claims seemed clear,
and it seemed that the government had a substantial task in proving that its
regulations were necessary and narrowly tailored to satisfy compelling
needs-a standard that was possible for the state to satisfy, but that clearly
favored preserving religious freedom. Yet, despite the apparent clarity of
the test, the Court had never authoritatively defined the terms "compelling
interest" or "burden on religion." Consequently, over the next twenty
years, the Court struggled with its application, sometimes finding
compelling interests to support government action that burdened religion,
sometimes creating exceptions to the use of the test, and sometimes failing
to apply the test at all.' 9
When using the test, the Court often found that the subject matter in
the case before it warranted exception to the compelling interest analysis.
Rather than defining the legal terms of the test or fashioning guidance for
determining what constitutes a compelling government interest and
applying that guidance to the interests before it, the Court avoided the
analysis, choosing instead to fashion judicially expedient exceptions or to
ignore the compelling interest test altogether. Examples of exceptions
20
created expressly or by omission of the test include military regulations
and prison regulations. 21 In addition, the lack of definition of the term
"burden" allowed courts to conclude many cases without even looking to
the compelling interest provisions by setting the burden on religion at a
high standard.2 2
For example, in 1979 the United States Forest Service approved
expansion of a forty-four-year-old ski resort, the Arizona Snowbowl, which

17. Id. at 234.
18. Id. at 222-29. Had the Court reverted to the jurisdictional test hypothetically created in
earlier cases, it is likely that the Amish would have been required to attend school even though it
was against their religion. See supra text accompanying note 8.
19. See Titus, supra note 8, at 15-22.
20. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (stating that the "review of military
regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society .... ").
21. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 342 (1987) (giving great deference to the
penal system that is similar to that given the military).
22. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1056 (1984).
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was operated under a Special Use Permit from the Forest Service.23 The
Snowbowl sits on land that is considered sacred by numerous Native
American tribes in the northern Arizona region.24 After the environmental
impact statement approved development, the tribes sued under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, alleging that the development of the
Peaks constituted a significant burden on their religion without a
compelling interest on the part of the government. 25 The three-judge panel
at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (which
included now Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) never analyzed
the compelling interest prong of the test because the judges held that the
tribes failed to show a burden on their religions.2 6 This lack of burden was
found because the Snowbowl ski resort constituted only a small percentage
of the Peaks and the tribes continued to have access to other areas of the
Peaks.27 The panel, while specifically stating that they were not involving
the courts in any determination of religious beliefs, went on to affirm the
lower court's decision because the religious practices of the tribes could be
performed at another site.28 According to the court, the analysis was not
about the centrality of a practice to religion, but about the importance of a
specific geographical location to that practice.29
Effectively, it was the lack of definition of the term "burden" that led
the Court of Appeals to its finding. The Supreme Court of the United Sates
denied certiorari, 3 ° leaving the uncertainty over what constitutes a burden,

23. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056
(1984). In response, several tribes alleged violations of their First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, fiduciary duties that the
government owed the tribes, the Endangered Species Act, the National Historic Preservation Act,
the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, the Wilderness Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and two federal statutes regulating private use of federal
lands. Id.
24. The Navajo, the Hopi, the Havasupai, the Hualapai, the Yavapai-Apache, and the White
Mountain Apache all consider the San Francisco Peaks to be significant to, if not central to, their
religious beliefs and practices. Id. at 739-40. This has never been in dispute in the legal actions.
See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034-38 (9th Cir. 2007).
25.

Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739.

26. Id. at 740.
27. Id. at 744-45 (noting that 777 of 75,000 acres (approximately I percent) were in use as
the resort at the time of the Wilson opinion).
28.
29.
30.
current
Impact

Id. at 744.
Id.
Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 464 U.S. 1056, 1056 (1984). Many of the activities in the
suit between the tribes and Snowbowl were approved under this 1979 Environmental
Statement. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 n.2 (2006).
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as well as what constitutes a compelling interest, to be argued among the
lower courts.31
III. Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Attempts
to Clarify Free Exercise Jurisprudence
In 1990, the Supreme Court moved away from the compelling interest
test in Employment Division v. Smith.32 This case brought before the Court
a terrible dilemma: a challenge to the state of Oregon's version of the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") on religious freedom grounds.33 The
Court clearly did not want to overturn an important criminal law with
tremendous public support and history, such as the state version of the
CSA, but was faced with a claim that the law violated the Free Exercise
Clause. Employing reasoning that hearkened back to the earliest of the free
exercise cases, a majority of the Court upheld the Oregon CSA and
reaffirmed that the state would violate the Free Exercise provisions of the
First Amendment if it regulated conduct specifically for religious reasons
or limited to religious circumstances. 34 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, then took an enormous step away from settled jurisprudence
by stating that when "prohibiting the exercise of religion.., is... merely
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended., 35 In making that
statement, the Court rejected the proposition that the compelling interest
test of Sherbert and Yoder applies to laws of general applicability and
instead limited the compelling interest test to unemployment compensation
rules. 36 Justice Scalia noted the long line of free exercise cases where the
test was not applied to facially neutral government action with an incidental
burden to religion.37 What the opinion failed to do was recognize that each
The panel in Wilson cited a number of lower court decisions from the Sixth and Tenth
as well as District Courts in California, South Dakota, and Alaska where no burden to
was found in land development cases. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 742-43 n.4.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
34. Id. at 877 (noting that it is likely true, but that no Supreme Court decision has
specifically stated such). For more on the history of Free Exercise jurisprudence, see supra text
accompanying note 5.
35. Id. at 878.
36. Id. at 880-83. In contrast, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, noted that "[tihe
compelling interest test [mandates] ... that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this
liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental
interests ....
" Id. at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 880, 883-84 (majority opinion) (Included in the list were prohibitions on
polygamy and child labor, validity of Sunday closure laws, the military draft and the requirements
to have a Social Security number, government logging and road building, military dress

31.
Circuits
religion
32.
33.
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of those exceptions constituted what the Court would consider a
compelling interest on the part of the government, at least in the eyes of the
Justices who made those decisions.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with the
Court's interpretation of First Amendment jurisprudence. Acknowledging
the problems the Court had allowed to persist in earlier cases, she
nevertheless noted that the First Amendment "does not distinguish between
laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious
,,38
practices.
In her analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence, joined by
three other Justices, she observed that the Court historically chose not to
apply the compelling interest test only in very narrow fields where the
government traditionally has great leeway (such as military and prison
regulations). 39 Her observations support the proposition that the problem
with the prior cases was not that the compelling interest test was flawed,
but that the Court itself failed to acknowledge that it was using the test. To
be even more correct, Justice O'Connor should have stated that the cases
cited by Justice Scalia as examples of not applying the compelling interest
test were, in fact, cases where the compelling interest test either implicitly
was applied, or instances where the interest was so obvious to the Court
that it went unstated.
Justice O'Connor correctly noted, however, that the First Amendment
limits on government action as enunciated by the majority were frivolous
since "few States would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or
burdening a religious practice as such."4 ° According to Justice O'Connor,
using the compelling interest test when evaluating the denial of
unemployment benefits, but not using the same when reviewing other
statutes that burdened religion was illogical.41
Instead, the proper
constitutional analysis would require applying the test even when it was
generally agreed that the state had a compelling interest, such as in cases
concerning criminal prohibitions.42 Justice O'Connor applied the test and
determined that the compelling interest in regulating controlled substances,
which was the issue in the Smith case, was sufficient for the law to be

regulations and prisoner work requirements.). See supra note 20 and accompanying text for more
discussion on this issue.
38. Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id.at 900-01.
40. Id. at 894.
41. Id. at 898.
42. Id. at 899.
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constitutional.43 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence but dissented as to the
result, applying the compelling government interest test but finding no such
interest in this case.
IV. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Almost immediately after the Smith decision, Congress looked to
Justice O'Connor's concurrence and began discussing legislation to restore
the compelling interest test.4 Bills were introduced in 1991 and 1992
before the RFRA finally passed in 1993, almost without opposition. 45 The
stated purpose of RFRA was to "restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert and Yoder and to guarantee its application
in all cases
46
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.,
The key provision of RFRA states that the "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability. 4 7 However, the statute also
provided that the government may substantially burden religion if there is a
compelling governmental interest and the burden is a result of the least
restrictive means to further that interest. 48 Unfortunately, Congress did no
better than the Supreme Court in defining the terms "burden" or
"compelling interest."
After the passage of RFRA, commentators and scholars argued at
great length whether the statute was constitutional. Opponents of RFRA
argued that Congress lacked any authority to pass such legislation and that
49
doing so violated the principles of separation of powers and federalism.
Conversely, proponents of RFRA argued that it was not a constitutionally
based law as applied to the federal government, but was instead a form of
43. Id. at 906. The three justices who joined Justice O'Connor's analysis of First
Amendment jurisprudence also applied the compelling interest test but determined that the
interests of the state were not sufficient.
44. S. REP. No. 103-11, at2 (1993).
45. Id; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000) (for
the final RFRA as amended in 2000); 139 CONG. REc. 26,416 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (reporting
97-3 Senate vote in favor of passage of RFRA); 139 CONG. REc. 27,239-41 (daily ed. Nov. 3,
1993) (reporting no objection to unanimous consent request in the House).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (2000).
47. Id. § 2000bb-l(a) (2000).
48. Id. § 2000bb-l(b) (2000).
49. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Angela Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1996) (arguing that RFRA violates separation of powers
principles); Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sagar, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) (arguing that RFRA is unconstitutional for

various reasons).
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self-regulation that committed the government to not burden religion in the
future.50 In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court declared
that RFRA was unconstitutional as to state and local governments, but
made no comment on its constitutionality as to the federal government. 51
In its most recent RFRA case, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the Supreme Court may have implicitly
upheld RFRA as constitutional when it upheld a preliminary injunction
granted under RFRA that prevented the enforcement of the Controlled
Substance Act.52 The Court may have implied that RFRA was valid
legislation when Justice Roberts wrote in the unanimous opinion, "[There
is no] cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts
under RFRA is an easy one." 53 At best, the Court may have suggested that
a court's task under RFRA is legitimate and that the legislation itself is
valid.54
The few Supreme Court RFRA opinions opened the door to more
legislation on religious freedom. In the aftermath of City of Boerne, states
began passing their own religious freedom acts. 55 In addition, Congress
spent three years in debate and then attempted to overturn City of Boerne in
part by passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
("RLUIPA"),56 which mandated the compelling interest test for claims
58
57
related to government land use regulations and institutionalized persons.
Yet instead of clarifying things, Congress merely added to the confusion.5 9

50. See generally Gregory Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
to FederalLaw Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903 (2001).
51. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-56 (1997).
52. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 418-39
(2006); see Frank J. Ducoat, Clarifying the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. CT. 1211 (2006), 8 RUTGERS J. L &
RELIGION 6 (2006). The Controlled Substances Act can be found at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971.
53. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 439.
54. Id.
Com. Stat. 35 (2007), Conn.
55. See, e.g., R.I. Gen Laws §§ 42-80.1-1 to -4 (2007); 775 I11.
Gen. Stat. § 52-57 lb (2008); Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 251 (2008).
56. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5
(2000); see Sara Smolik, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was It a Waste?, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723, 724 (2005) (giving a brief legislative history of RLUIPA).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l) (2000). RLUIPA is only available to plaintiffs who can show
an ownership interest in the land in order to focus on zoning regulations and to not interfere with
government use ofgovernment-owned land.
58. Id. § 2000cc-l(a). However, RLUIPA was held constitutional by the Court in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). Justice Ginsburg noted in a footnote that the Supreme
Court has not addressed the constitutionality ofRFRA. Id. at 715 n.2.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000).
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The current dispute regarding the Arizona Snowbowl is evidence of this
confusion.
V. Free Exercise Confusion in Play:
The Current Snowbowl Suit
The Arizona Snowbowl dispute is an ideal example of how the Smith
developments have created nothing but confusion. In 2002, new owners of
Snowbowl submitted a proposal to add a snowplay area and implement
snowmaking at the resort using reclaimed water.6 ° In response to this
proposal, the United States Forest Service issued an environmental impact
statement permitting the requested developments to be made. 6'
Again, the Navajo Nation and the Sierra Club jointly filed a lawsuit.62
As in the earlier case, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the free exercise of
religion, but now under RFRA instead of the First Amendment.6 3 The
tribes could not sue under RLUIPA because their lack of ownership interest
in the Peaks precluded such a suit. 64 In addition, the parties could not use
the Arizona version of RFRA 65 because federal, rather than Arizona state
government action, was implicated.
The district court held an eleven-day bench trial on the RFRA claim
and issued an opinion that read very much like the Wilson decision. 66 In a
few brief paragraphs, Judge Rosenblatt noted that RFRA imposed the
compelling interest test as it existed prior to the Smith case and
acknowledged the definitional problem, stating that the lack of definition in
RFRA should be clarified using pre-Smith Free Exercise case law.67 But
because the Supreme Court never set forth a satisfying definition either,
Judge Rosenblatt referred back to a Ninth Circuit definition.6 8 Using that

60. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870-71 (2006).
61. Id.at 869 n.3.
62. By the time the case was set for trial, numerous plaintiffs were added and separate
complaints were consolidated so that the final list of plaintiffs included the Navajo Tribe, the
Sierra Club, the White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Yavapai-Apache Tribe, the Center for
Biological Diversity, the Flagstaff Activist Network, the Hopi Tribe, the Hualapai Tribe, the
Havasupai Tribe and a number of individual members of those tribes. See id. at 869 n. 1.
63. Id. at 871.
64. See 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5 (2000).
65. A.R.S. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2008).
66. Judge Rosenblatt cites to the Wilson opinion a number of times in coming to the same
conclusion. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 904-06 (2006).
67. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
68. The test used states that "an action 'burdens the free exercise of religion if it puts
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs, including
when.., it results in the choice of an individual of either abandoning his religious principle or
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definition, and citing Wilson, the court then found that the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that the developments and approved upgrades would burden
their religion.69
Unlike the panel in Wilson, Judge Rosenblatt continued in his opinion
to address the "compelling interest" and the "least restrictive means"
provisions of the RFRA test to ensure that his rationale was clear to the
appellate courts in what would be an inevitable appeal.7 ° Interestingly, he
did not enunciate any test or definition for determining whether an interest
was a "compelling interest., 71 Even so, Judge Rosenblatt articulated three
compelling interests to support the decision by the Forest Service: The
federal mandate that the Forest Service hold federal lands for multiple uses,
the safety of skiers, and the potential violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment if development was blocked.72
In determining whether the approved upgrades were the least
restrictive means to achieve those compelling interests, the court gave
deference to the thorough investigation of alternatives completed by the
Forest Service in addition to an inability of the tribes to proffer any means
that were less restrictive than the Forest Service's approved means.73 Judge
Rosenblatt found for the defendants on the RFRA claim, allowing the
owners of the Snowbowl to improve operations through, among other
things, the making of snow using reclaimed water.
Just a year later, a Ninth Circuit panel overturned the district court
with regard to the RFRA analysis in Navajo Nation.74 The panel rejected
Judge Rosenblatt's Wilson-like analysis of the burden and held that the
introduction of reclaimed water to the snow areas alters the analysis and
would significantly burden the tribes' religions.
In moving to the
compelling interest prong of the test, the Ninth Circuit rejected the stated
compelling interests as too general as well as insufficient to meet the
standard of the test.75 Citing either the lack of evidence or the lack of

facing criminal prosecution."' Id. at 903-04 (citing Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
69. Id. at 905-06 (analogizing to Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
to highlight that the plaintiffs in Navajo Nation would not endure a substantial burden to practice

their religion under RFRA.)
70. Id. at 906-07.
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 906.

73. Id. at 907.
74. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
75. Id. at 1045.
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connection to the stated interest, the Ninth Circuit quickly moved on to a
discussion of RFRA and the status of the law.76
In its analysis, the panel attempted to clarify the confusion over RFRA
by claiming that the protections of RFRA for religion were much larger
than the previous protections of the First Amendment.77 As part of their
argument, the panel looked directly to the definitional problem previously
noted. They specifically mentioned that the use of the term "burden
religion" instead of the First Amendment language of "prohibiting the free
exercise thereof' in the statute indicated a difference in meaning. 78 The
fallacy of this argument is that the Supreme Court itself consistently used
the term "burden on religion" in analyzing cases under the First
Amendment. Still, even as fantastic as this statement seems, it was
consistent with prior statements made by the Ninth Circuit with regard to
RFRA.
Within three years of the passage of RFRA, and even before the
amendments of RLUIPA, the Ninth Circuit noted in 1996-eleven years
before deciding Navajo Nation-that RFRA's language mandates 79a
different analysis than the language of the First Amendment.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "statute goes beyond the
constitutional language that forbids the 'prohibiting' of the free exercise of
religion and uses the broader verb 'burden' .... ,80 In Navajo Nation, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a new definition of burden, stating that it "must
prevent the plaintiff 'from
engaging in [religious] conduct or having a
81
religious experience. '
Beyond the definition of "burden," the Ninth Circuit continued to
argue that RFRA was broader than the First Amendment even though
RFRA directly states the intention of Congress to restore the compelling
interest test to cases related to free exercise of religion claims. 82 In their
view, RFRA was more protective of religious liberties than the First
Amendment was prior to Smith because RFRA expanded the compelling

76. Id. at 1045-46. The Forest Service and the owners of Snowbowl argued that the
economic survival of the resort depended on snowmaking and that the closure of Snowbowl
would eliminate the multiple uses required. The court noted that, even if the closure of

Snowbowl was a realistic possibility, there is no compelling government interest in avoiding that
result.

77. Id. at 1032.
78. Id.
79. United States v. Bauer, 804 F.3d 1549, 1558 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. Id.
81. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d
948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original).
82. Id. at 1033 (ignoring the statutory language found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (2000)).
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interest test to every government action that may burden religion.8 3 The
Ninth Circuit panel pointed to those areas where the test apparently was not
utilized as examples where courts used less demanding tests to determine if
a regulation that impacted religion was valid.84 The panel also pointed to
Justice Kennedy's language in City of Boerne v. Flores where Justice
Kennedy also failed to acknowledge the implicit judging of the interests
when stating that prior cases did not utilize the compelling interest test. 8' It
is important to note that the apparent legitimacy of such arguments are
premised around the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly use the
compelling interest test in applicable instances and choosing instead to
write opinions as if the compelling interest test, no matter how implicitly
present, did not apply.
On May 28, 2007, the United States Forest Service and the owners of
the Snowbowl filed a petition for rehearing with the Ninth Circuit. 86 On
August 8, 2008, the en banc panel issued its opinion that reflected much of
the debate during oral arguments. 87 During those arguments of December
of 2007, it was clear that the judges were struggling with the definitions
and scope of RFRA. Chief Judge Kozinski questioned one of the tribe's
attorneys regarding the scope of RFRA and the textual basis for expansion
beyond pre-Smith doctrine. 88 Other questions related to how far RFRA
could expand prior First Amendment jurisprudence without facing an
Establishment Clause violation and whether a broad interpretation of
RFRA would create some "categorical exclusion" of the ability of the
government to control and use government lands. 89 Discussion with
counsel from all parties also covered the terminology in the statute,

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
86. See Cyndy Cole, Snowbowl Owner Vows to Pursue Snowmai'ng,ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Mar. 13,2007,
at Al, available at http://www.azdailysun.com/articles/2007/03/13/news/20070313_news_12.txt;
see also Howard Fischer, Snowbowl Fight Rages On, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Mar. 13, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.azdailysun.com/articles/2007/03/13/news/20070313_news_1 .txt; Cyndy
Cole, Denial of Snowmaking Appealed, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, May 31, 2007, at Al, available at

http://www.azdailysun.com/articies/2007/05/3/news/2007053

-front%20page-I .txt.

The en

banc panel included Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and Judges Pregerson, O'Scannlain, Rymer,

Kleinfield, Silverman, Fletcher, Fisher, Clifton, Bea and Ikuta. The hearing is available online at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ [hereinafter En Banc Oral Arguments] (follow: "Audio Files"
hyperlink and enter "06-15371EB" as the "case number").
87. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 06-15371, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16860 (9th
Cir. Aug. 8, 2008).
88. En Banc Oral Arguments, supra note 86.

89. Id.
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specifically the term "substantial burden." 90 Specifically, one judge asked
for a unified definition of "substantial burden" from the tribes and
individuals who brought suit.9 1 The term "compelling government interest"
also came into the debate as one judge asked why the management of the
government's own 92land by the government simply would not be a
compelling interest.
The six-judge majority's opinion attempted to clarify the definitional
issues addressed in the oral arguments, focusing on the term "substantial
burden." 93 The opinion focused on RFRA's stated purpose of restoring the
compelling interest "as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner... and Wisconsin v.
Yoder."94 Taking this to mean that Congress intended a limited definition

of the term to situations directly like those in Sherbert and Yoder, the Court
stated that a "substantial burden" only occurs "when individuals are forced
to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a
governmental benefit (Sherbert) or coerced to act contrary to their religious
beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder). 95 Under this
combined definition, the Court found no burden on the tribe's religion and
thus did not need to address the definition of "compelling government
interest." In the dissenting opinion, three of the panel judges argued that
the majority's definition was unduly restrictive and ignored all of the
opinions interpreting the Free Exercise Clause between Yoder and Smith.96
The dissent pointed to the historical jurisprudence as well as the broad
scope of RFRA as stated in the statute to support a broader interpretation of
the term "substantial burden., 97 The dissent adopted a prior Ninth Circuit
definition, stating that religion is burdened "where government action
prevents an individual 'from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a
religious experience'
and the interference is 'more than an
98
inconvenience."'
Because the Ninth Circuit majority's definition was created by the
panel and is not founded in any direct Supreme Court language, it is
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Other topics of discussion related to the ability of the Forest Service to rely on the
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality's determination of the safety of the water. Id.
93. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 06-15371, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16860 at *16
(9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2008).
94. Id. at *21 (referring to the language in 2 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5)).
95. Id. at *24.

96. Id. at *74-75.
97. Id. at *76-100.
98. Id. at *108 (quoting Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in
original).
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expected that the native tribes will ask the Supreme Court to hear the case,
opening the door for the Justices to clear up the confusion they began with
the Smith opinion.
VI. Relieving the Current Burden
The Snowbowl dispute is a clear example of the confusion that has
been created by the Smith decision and the enactment of RFRA in response
to it. The Supreme Court must address this confusion and is likely to have
the opportunity with the Snowbowl dispute. The discussion of the issues
that need resolution revolves around the constitutionality of RFRA, the
viability of Smith, and the vocabulary and definitions of key Free Exercise
terms. The Supreme Court has three viable options with regard to the
problem. The first option is to declare RFRA constitutional and then
address the two issues set out by the Ninth Circuit panel in Navajo Nation:
the scope of RFRA and the definitions of the terms of RFRA. While this
option is viable, it does not address the concerns of multiple religious
freedom laws or the proper constitutional place for religious freedom. The
second option is to declare RFRA unconstitutional, and do nothing else,
leaving the Smith analysis as the current state of the law. The final, and
most preferable approach, would entail declaring RFRA unconstitutional,
overturning Smith and setting forth appropriate definitions for the terms of
the compelling interest test.
A. Option 1: Working Within the Current Structure and Patching the
Problem
Should the Supreme Court declare RFRA constitutional as to the
federal government, then they must address two other questions: the scope
of RFRA and the interpretation of defined terms in RFRA.
1.

The Scope ofRFRA

If RFRA is constitutional, then the Supreme Court must address the
concerns of the original Ninth Circuit panel with regard to the scope of
RFRA. 99 The legislative history of RFRA provides clear evidence of
Congress's intent to reverse the effect of the Smith decision.'00 For
instance, Representative Brooks of Texas stated that RFRA "will restore
the standard for addressing claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the
99. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. E1243-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Franks); 139 CONG. REC.
E1234-01 (1993) (statement of Rep. Cardin); 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of
Rep. Brooks); 139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Tucker); S. REP. 103-111, at
1898 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-88 (1993).
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First Amendment as it was prior to the Supreme Court's Smith decision in
1990."'' In addition, Representative Hyde of Illinois spoke in support of
RFRA stating that it "will overturn the 1990 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Employment Division versus Smith."' 10 2 Further, current Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi, then a California Representative, stated that "it
is necessary to return the criteria for abridging religious freedom to preSmith days."' 0 3 Moreover, the committee report to the full U.S. Senate
declared that RFRA was "intended to restore the compelling interest test
previously applicable to free exercise cases."'10 4 Never in the available
legislative history did a senator or representative argue that RFRA should
be passed because it increased the protections to religion. Therefore, if the
Court takes this route, it will have to contend with a Ninth Circuit
interpretation of the statute that in no way took this legislative history into
account.
Also, nowhere in the legislative history is there any discussion of the
exceptions that were made in First Amendment jurisprudence prior to
Smith. For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, decided just two years prior to the Smith opinion, Justice
O'Connor refused to apply the compelling interest test where Native
American tribes brought a First Amendment claim stating that the
government violated their free exercise rights by putting a highway through
sacred lands and thus destroying the sacred nature of the lands. 10 5 Justice
O'Connor relied on an exception related to the conduct of the
"government's internal procedures" to state that the land at issue was
federal land and that individuals do not have the right to extract behavior
from the government. 106
Even if the Court adopts the Ninth Circuit's broad reading of RFRA,
the Court would then be forced to reconcile that compelling interest
analysis with the Lyng decision. In their Lyng dissent, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun noted that the majority "[did] not for a moment
suggest that the interests served by the . . road are in any way compelling,

101.
102.

139 CONG. REc. H2356-03 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
Id. (statement of Rep. Hyde).

103. Id. (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
104. S. REP. No. 103-111 at 1898 (1993).
105. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Interestingly,
Justice O'Connor wrote the Lyng opinion and then dissented in Smith, the very case that resulted
in the passage of RFRA and the potential new standard that will create a result distinctly different
from the Lyng opinion.

106. Id. at 448-53.
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or that they outweigh the destructive effect
construction of the road will
10 7
have on the [tribe's] religious practices.'
In Lyng, Justice O'Connor failed to recognize that she was on some
level applying the compelling interest test to the facts to determine that the
interest was compelling. Instead, she fell into the same trap as prior
Justices in looking to an "exception." As noted above, 0 8 the Court should
review its cases where exceptions were created or where the compelling
interest test was omitted from opinions and clarify that the use of the test
was there, albeit implicit. As such, the Court should be faithful to the
language and legislative history and clarify the scope of the statute, noting
that the use of the test in all cases is appropriate and more true to precedent
than the Ninth Circuit indicated.
2.

The Language of RFRA

Though the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that RFRA mandates
the adoption of pre-Smith standards, the lack of definitions for key terms in
RFRA, as well as the passage of RLUIPA and its cross-referenced terms,
continues to create ambiguity in lower courts. 0 9 Because the definition of
"exercise of religion" in RFRA is referenced to the definition in RLUIPA,
0
it is informative to look at the two together."
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit looked to Supreme Court jurisprudence to
determine the meaning of "substantial burden" for RLUIPA and stated that
a substantial burden "must impose a significantly great restriction or onus"
on a religious exercise."' In Navajo Nation, the original Ninth Circuit
panel adopted yet a different definition for RFRA, stating that a burden
"must prevent the plaintiff 'from engaging in [religious] conduct or having
a religious experience.""' 12 Thus for two statutes with similar language, the
Ninth Circuit has different definitions to follow.
In interpreting RLUIPA, the Fifth Circuit quoted the legislative
history to conclude that the term "substantial burden" should be interpreted

107. Id. at 465.
108. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
109. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423, 430
(2006) (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)), the
Supreme Court stated, "[RFRA] adopts a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule
rejected in Smith," and that "Congress' express decision to legislate the compelling interest test

indicates that RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally
mandated applications of the test."
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2000).
111. Guru Nanak Sikh v. Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006).
112. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bryant
v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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under the Supreme Court's prior Free Exercise jurisprudence. 1 3 In
reviewing prior cases, the court stated that a substantial burden exists "if it
truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior
and significantly violate his religious beliefs."'" 4 In coming to a similar
conclusion in 2006, the Seventh Circuit looked to the legislative history of
RLUIPA, where co-sponsors Senators Kennedy and Hatch released a joint
statement explaining that RLUIPA did not define "substantial burden"
precisely because it was not intended to create a new standard and that
prior Supreme Court jurisprudence should guide courts in interpreting the
statute." 5 In its final determination, the Seventh Circuit adopted a very
different definition, stating that a substantial burden is one that "bears
direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility
for rendering religious
' 16
impracticable."
effectively
...
exercise
As to the definition of the term "compelling interest," the courts have
not enunciated a clear definition; nonetheless, there is some general
agreement as to the meaning. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit hearkened back to
Yoder and stated, "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion."'" 7 Even so, the Supreme Court has had a hard time over the
years defining interests as "compelling" and instead created exceptions to
the rules. They should instead reaffirm a definition and then give examples
from prior cases of "exceptions" that really were compelling interests.
They will not need to overturn any other precedents, merely restate and
clarify their opinions in those other cases.
At a minimum, the Supreme Court needs to set forth standard
definitions for the terms "substantial burden" and "compelling interest" if
they accept RFRA as constitutional. The end result in the Snowbowl
dispute will depend on the scope and definition adopted by the Court." 8
Should the Court narrowly define "compelling interest" but broadly look at
the term "burden," the government may be forced to close down the ski
resort on federal land." 19

113. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004).
114. Id.at 570.
115. Vision Church v. Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006).
116. Id.
117. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1043 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
118. More important than the actual result of the case is a cleaner legal environment in which

to move forward.
119. It is unclear how many other businesses would be affected by this interpretation of the
Court.
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B.

Option 2: The Death of RFRA and Resurrection of Smith
As mentioned above, several commentators have argued that RFRA is
unconstitutional for several different reasons. 120 Debate among scholars
often focuses on the power of Congress to pass RFRA under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 12 Professors Eisgruber and Sagar of New
York University argued that RFRA was unconstitutional because it
increased free exercise to beyond pre-Smith understandings. 122 This is
exactly what the Ninth Circuit noted Navajo Nation when describing how
RFRA differs from the First Amendment. 23 In addition, Eisgruber and
Sagar properly argue that RFRA is an assault on the integrity of judicial
independence as Congress is usurping the judiciary's role as interpreter of
the Constitution through the statutory process instead of the amendment
process. 124 Professor Gressman of North Carolina and Professor Carmella
of Seton Hall posit that RFRA is an unconstitutional violation of the
separation of powers principle.125 Regardless of the rationale, a declaration
that RFRA is unconstitutional would move the law in the right direction.
If the Court does this, with no other action, Smith becomes the law of
the land once again. This result is clearly unacceptable to Congress and
could result in a battle between the judicial and legislative branches to
either amend the Constitution or develop a religious freedom law that the
Court would find constitutional. In either case, RLUIPA and the state
religious freedom laws would still be in effect, giving multiple statutes and
analyses for many different types of free exercise claims. Still, without
more action, an opinion that RFRA is unconstitutional would do little or
nothing to correct the confusion that currently exists. Clearly more action
is required of the Court.
C. Option 3: The Death of RFRA and Smith: Maintaining the True
Balance
By adopting the third option-declaring RFRA unconstitutional and
overturning Smith-the Court has an opportunity to clarify the confusion
120. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. In addition, Justice Stevens, in concurrence
in Boerne, stated that he believed RFRA "'is a law respecting an establishment of religion' that
violates the First Amendment to the Constitution." Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
121. See, e.g., Robert Drinan & Jennifer Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A
Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION, 531, 533 (1993) (noting a general agreement that
Congress had authority to pass the statute but also noting some debate on the issue).
122. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 444. As mentioned in the text, this argument may
be somewhat fallacious.
123. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Sew., 479 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 1995).
124. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 469-73.
125.

See, e.g., Gressman & Carmella, supra note 49.
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and develop a universal standard for free exercise claims. The Court
should take this approach and put religion back in its proper place as a key
civil liberty. In doing so, the Court still must face two issues: the scope of
the test and the definitions of terms used in the test. The Court can do this
within the constitutional framework. Finally, the Court could go even one
step further and use the Snowball dispute to encourage more transparency
in government.
1. Religion's ProperPlace
The current federal paradigm for religious freedom law includes
RFRA for federal actions, RLUIPA for any government actions covering
land use or incarceration, and the First Amendment for analysis of state and
local laws or regulations. There also are state acts that parallel RFRA that
were passed after the Supreme Court decided City of Boerne.'16 This
splintered approach to free exercise analysis could lead to different results
for the same actions depending on which government entity took the
action. For a right that was foundational enough to warrant inclusion in the
First Amendment, this is not acceptable. The Supreme Court must take this
opportunity to render this confusion null by declaring RFRA
unconstitutional, by overturning Smith, and by clarifying the compelling
interest test. These actions will restore religious freedom to its proper place
as a constitutionally protected right.
As noted above, declaring RFRA unconstitutional has been supported
by a numbers of legal scholars.' 27 The Court should not only do so, but
should also revisit the Smith opinion. This too is not surprising. As early
as 1996, Professor Gressman of North Carolina and Professor Carmella of
Seton Hall noted that reconsideration of Smith would be an appropriate step
to take. 128 One year later, Justice O'Connor dissented in the Boerne case
and argued that the parties should be ordered to brief whether Smith
represents the appropriate or correct understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause.129 In fact, the only way to fix the underlying issue of the Smith
interpretation of the First Amendment is for the Court overturn Smith.
In overturning Smith, the Court should acknowledge that a clarified
and properly defined compelling interest test is the appropriate test for any

126. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 35 N.M. STAT. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (1978).
127. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
128. Gressman & Carmella, supra note 49, at 141. Gressman and Carmella note that one of
the majority voters and three of the four dissenters in Smith had retired by the time their article
was written. Id. at 141 n.288. As of this writing, only Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy, all
from the Smith majority, remain on the Court.
129. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997).
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governmental burden on religion. While Professors Eisgruber and Sagar
argue that the compelling interest test is "wholly unworkable,"'130 I argue
that the test is perfectly workable if the Court will take the appropriate
steps in defining scope and terminology.
As to scope, the Court should look to the RFRA arguments on scope
to clarify the scope of the First Amendment.1 3 1 The confusion created by
RFRA has provided a clearer picture of some of the problems with prior
First Amendment jurisprudence. It has noted the exceptions to, and
omissions of, the test in prior judicial opinions.132 To clarify what the First
Amendment really means, and to alleviate uncertainty on the part of
legislative bodies that may burden religion in their actions, the Court
should give direction for the application of the test. As mentioned above,
the test is appropriately applied to all government action. The exceptions
created to the application of the test were actually implicit judgments on
the compelling nature of the government interest.
As to the definitional problems, those too are easily resolved. The
guidance to the definitions of "burden" and
Court should give some
"compelling interest."' 33
Discussion of these terms can be found
previously in this article, but the exact definition at this stage is less
important than the fact that guidance comes from the Court.
One key aspect of the test that was not addressed in the Snowbowl
dispute is the "least restrictive manner" element.1 34 Analyzing this factor is
more objective than analyzing whether an interest is compelling or whether
a religion is burdened. One can do an economical cost-benefit analysis of
alternatives to determine if the chosen activity is the least restrictive (or
least burdensome) way to achieve the compelling government interest.
No matter what alternatives meet the "burden," "compelling interest,"
and "least restrictive manner" definitions, this analysis would properly
place religion back on the level of constitutional primacy. A Supreme
Court decision to unify free exercise analysis under the First Amendment,
with use of the compelling interest test, would be consistent with the

130.
131.
132.

Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 49, at 451.
See supra Part VI.A.1.
See discussion supra Part II for an examination of the compelling interest test.

133. See supra Part VI.Al.
134. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 907 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(discussing the lack of less restrictive alternatives without discussion of what the term "least
restrictive" means); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that the court was not convinced that the least restrictive means were used, but failing to
define that term); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 06-15371, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
16860 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2008) (no discussion of the meaning of the term "least restrictive means"
because of a lack of burden to the plaintiff's religion).
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desires of the nation, as evidenced by the strength of the vote for RFRA.
It also would create the predictability and stability desired of the law.
In addition to correcting the place of religion, the changes spurred by
the decision recommended could also help the legislative branch and
administrative agencies re-focus on the Constitutional limits to their
authority.1 36 The Court should remind these governmental entities that they
have limited power, and that it is the responsibility of those entities to
demonstrate from where the authority to act comes.
2.

Transparencyof Government

Just as the duty to enunciate the compelling government interest
should reside with the government when regulating religion, the duty to
enunciate the authority to act at all should also reside with the government
and should be addressed before laws are passed or regulations issued. This
supports the principles of accountability in government and
the limited
137
nature of the federal government as found in the Constitution.
In declaring RFRA unconstitutional, the Court should specifically note
that any mention of the authority of Congress to pass RFRA was buried in
legislative history.1 38 Congress and the administrative agencies are
involved in thousands of different issues. 139
Yet the source of
Congressional authority to regulate is not clear in reviewing recent bills.
Moreover, none of the bills give the slightest inclination as to the source of
power to Congress.140 Definitive statements by the Court indicating that
the legislative bodies bear the responsibility of enunciating their source of
power to regulate could result in clearer, and perhaps fewer, pieces of
legislation. The Court could go so far as to analyze First Amendment free
exercise cases by evaluating the government's own declaration and
evidence of its compelling interest. The Court could encourage Congress
to take this responsibility by declaring any law which substantially burdens

135. See supra note 45.
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. A cursory review of the bills before the 110th Congress
indicates that none of the bills states any authority for Congressional regulation.
See
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/cll0bills.html for a list of bills before the I 10th Congress (last
visited Dec. 21, 2007).
138. See, e.g., Drinan & Huffman, supra note 121, at 533.
139. The 110th Congress had over 7200 bills before the House or Senate in 2007.
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/cl0bills.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).

See

140. Id. As noted in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997), the Supreme
Court rendered RFRA unconstitutional as to the states in an analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment. RFRA itself never mentions the authority under which Congress portended to pass
the statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
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religion-yet lacks Congress's express statements both defining the interest
to be furthered and defending it as "compelling"-as an unconstitutional
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
For example, in the Lyng case, the Court did not use the compelling
interest test because the burden on religion stemmed from internal
government procedures. 14 1 Instead, the Court should have declared the
government action as unconstitutional given the lack of a clearly
enunciated compelling interest. If the government could not enunciate a
compelling interest, perhaps none existed and the road should have been
relocated to another route. In fact, with regard to the road in Lyng,
Congress denied funding. 142 Had the government agency been forced to
defend its compelling interest prior to approving the route, it may have seen
that there really was no compelling interest. Other "exceptions" can be
viewed similarly. 143 While to some this may be viewed merely as a matter
of semantics, it is an important difference that could result in a systemic
change should the Court send the right message to Congress and the other
government bodies.
Congress itself has shown some concern over accountability in
government. Unfortunately, its concern looks at external sources, internal
administrative processes, and lobbying; rarely, if ever, is the legislative
On March 13, 2007, the Openness Promotes
process examined.
Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007 ("OPEN
Government Act") was introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy 144 and later
signed into law by President Bush on December 31, 2007.145 This act
specifically amended the Freedom of Information Act so that citizens have

141. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 448-53 (1988). In Lyng,
the government was building a road to connect two California towns. Id. at 442. The Forest
Service placed the road in a particular location to avoid soil stability problems as well as potential
eminent domain problems. Id. at 443. It is unclear whether the need for the road between the two
towns would be a compelling interest.
142. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 49, at 94.
143. See, for example, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), for a case in which the
Supreme Court did not apply the compelling interest test to a challenged military regulation
prohibiting a Jewish man from wearing a yarmulke. The Court exempted the military from the
compelling interest test out of deference to the military's role and its standing as a separate
governmental entity, distinct from civilian society. Id. at 509-10. The Court just as easily could
have stated that the uniform dress in the military is a compelling government interest for any
number of reasons. The key difference would be that the military would have to set forth those

interests.
144. Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, S. 849,
100th Cong. (2007).
145. The OPEN Government Act was signed as Pub. L. No. 110-175 (codified as 5 U.S.C.

§ 552).
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easier and faster access to information. 146 And though it did not address
accountability of Congress to justify its actions, it may have increased the
ability of the people to search through government documents. The Honest
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 became law on September
14, 2007.14' This law addresses lobbying issues, issues of employment
negotiations for outgoing members of Congress, and issues of earmarked
spending. 148 The only issue it addresses regarding public accountability is
to improve intemet access for committee hearings. 149 It also does not
address the issue of transparency in legislative authority.' 50 The Improving
Government Accountability Act was introduced in the House and currently
sits in committee with the Senate. 15' This legislation would amend the
Inspector General Act but, again, does not address transparency in the
writing of legislation or regulation by federal agencies. 152
While it appears that Congress is concerned about transparency and
accountability in government, it has not yet addressed (and possibly has not
thought about) its own responsibilities to exercise those powers specifically
granted to it by the Constitution. 53 The Supreme Court should use the
Snowbowl dispute to remind Congress of these limitations and chastise it to
identify its authority in each bill it introduces.
Conclusion
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has suffered
through a number of growing pains in the history of our country. As
demonstrated by the Snowbowl dispute, religious freedom jurisprudence is
complicated and fragmented. The most appropriate analysis used by courts
has been the compelling interest test, enunciated in the 1960s and used
directly until 1990. The Supreme Court has an opportunity, through the
Snowbowl dispute, to correct the series of complications. The Justices
should take this opportunity to place religion back in its rightful sphere as a
constitutionally protected civil liberty and to encourage Congress and the
146. See Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, S. 849,
100th Cong. (2007).
147. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) introduced Senate Bill I on January 4, 2007.
It was signed into law as Pub. L. No. 110-081 on September 14, 2007 and codified throughout the
United States Code and the Rules of the House of Representatives.
148. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, S. 1, 100th Cong. (2007).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Improving Government Accountability Act, H.R. 928, 11 0th Cong. (2007). This bill is
currently in the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.
152. Id.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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other federal units to become more accountable for the authority of their
actions.
By adopting the approach in this article, the Court also has an
opportunity to require the federal government to increase its awareness of
the relationship between business and religion. By clarifying what
constitutes the test for Free Exercise challenges, and by encouraging the
government to clearly identify and defend the compelling interests it
intends to advance when it passes regulation or legislation that impacts
religion, all parties affected by such regulation will have a better sense of
the difficult issues facing our government in balancing the competing
interests of religion and business.
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